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The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both 
minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral 
sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal 
and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind 
expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a 
robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R.  Two attempts 
to specify R are discussed, both based on the thought that beliefs are states that 
aim at truth. According to the first, robust beliefs are criticisable to the extent 
that their content fails to match the state of the world. This sense fails to 
distinguish robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. According to the second, robust 
beliefs function to have their content match the state of the world. This sense 
succeeds in distinguishing robust beliefs from minimal beliefs. The conclusion 
is that the debate concerning the cognitive status of moral convictions needs to 
address the issue of the function of moral convictions. Evolutionary theorising 
may be relevant, but will not be decisive, to answering this question.  
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1. An inconsistent triad 
 
The following three propositions are apparently mutually inconsistent:  
 
(1) Moral sentences are syntactically disciplined. This claim has two components: 
(1a)  Moral sentences are syntactically sophisticated, that is, they are 
capable of significant embedding in negations, conditionals, 
propositional attitude operators and other subsentential constructions. 
(1b) Moral sentences are disciplined, that is, they are subject to clear 
standards of appropriate and inappropriate usage. 
 
(2) There is a conceptually necessary connection between a sentence being 
syntactically disciplined and sincere assertoric use of that sentence serving to 
express a belief (whose content is captured by such usage). This claim has two 
components: 
(2a)  There is a conceptually necessary connection between a sentence being 
syntactically disciplined and that sentence being truth-apt. 
(2b) There is a conceptually necessary connection between a sentence being 
truth-apt and sincere assertoric use of that sentence serving to express a 
belief (whose content is captured by such usage). 
 
(3) Moral sentences in their sincere assertoric uses do not serve to express beliefs 
(whose content is captured by such usage). Rather, they serve to express some 
affective attitude of the agent, such as an emotion, preference or practical 
stance. 
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The first claim – moral syntacticism – is supported by simple reflection on our 
actual use of moral sentences, which readily feature in negations, conditionals and 
other such constructions (syntactic sophistication) and are subject to clear standards of 
appropriate usage (discipline). In this, moral sentences contrast with sentences such as 
'Ouch!', which  are not syntactically sophisticated and sentences of a private language, 
which  (if Wittgenstein was right) are not disciplined. 
 
The second claim – call it minimalism – holds that being syntactically 
disciplined suffices for a sentence to be truth-apt, that is, express assertoric content 
[(2a)].
1
 A truth-apt sentence will then be true just in case assertion of that sentence 
satisfies the standards of appropriate usage for the discourse in which it features. 
Minimalism holds further that being truth-apt suffices for sincere assertoric use of that 
sentence to express a belief [(2b)].  
The two claims of minimalism have distinct sources of support.  
Wright supports (2a) on the basis of a two-fold theoretical advantage (1992: 
74-75). The first is that so construing truth-aptness deals with the headache of mixed 
inferences, that is, inferences that involve sentences only some of which would 
qualify as truth-apt under more stringent criteria of truth-aptness. The second is that 
that (2a) conserves our prereflective practice of allowing talk of truth and inference to 
a wide range of discourses that might not satisfy more stringent criteria of truth-
aptness, such as discourse concerning the comic and the delightful. 
The second claim of minimalism is arguably analytic. Wright claims: 
 
                                                          
1
 This view is sometimes called ‗disciplined syntacticism‘, for example in Lenman 2003. 
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Assertion has the following analytic tie to belief: if someone makes an 
assertion, and is supposed sincere, it follows that she has a belief whose 
content can be captured by means of the sentences used. (1992: 14) 
  
 The third claim is moral expressivism, most recently defended by Blackburn 
(1984, 1998b) and Gibbard (1990). 
 
 Though each of (1), (2) and (3) can be made to look plausible, it appears that 
they cannot all be true, since accepting any two of the claims provides an argument 
against the third.  
 
 First, moral syntacticism and minimalism appear to jointly entail the falsity of 
expressivism. If moral sentences are syntactically disciplined, and if being 
syntactically disciplined suffices for being truth-apt, which in turn suffices for sincere 
assertoric use of such sentences serving to express beliefs, then sincere assertoric uses 
of moral sentences express beliefs. That is, (1) and (2) entail that (3) is false (Lenman 
2003: 36). 
This argument bears some resemblance to the ‗Frege-Geach‘ problem facing 
expressivism (Geach 1965). That is the problem of explaining how, if moral sentences 
express attitudes, they can function in non-assertoric contexts such as conditionals, 
where no attitude is apparently expressed. The Frege-Geach point is generally 
regarded as laying down a challenge to the expressivist – that of explaining how 
moral sentences can occur in non-assertive contexts. But minimalism turns this 
challenge into a decisive refutation. For by taking the appearance of moral sentences 
in non-assertive contexts as a decisive mark of truth-aptness, and by linking truth-
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aptness to belief, the minimalist claims that the problematic phenomenon pointed out 
by Geach actually entails the falsity of expressivism.  
 
Second, moral syntacticism and expressivism appear to entail the falsity of 
minimalism. If moral sentences are syntactically disciplined and yet in their sincere 
assertoric uses do not serve to express beliefs then there can be no necessary 
connection between sentences being syntactically disciplined and sincere assertoric 
uses of those sentences expressing beliefs. That is, (1) and (3) entail that (2) is false.  
 Those who accept this argument may go on to reject (2a), (2b), or both. 
Rejecting (2a) on the basis of this argument amounts to the claim that it is possible for 
a sentence to be syntactically disciplined without being truth-apt, and that moral 
sentences are like this (Jackson, Oppy, Smith 1994). Rejecting (2b) on the same basis 
amounts to the claim that it is possible for a sentence to be truth-apt even though 
sincere assertoric use of that sentence fails to express a belief, and that moral 
sentences are like this (Blackburn 1998a). Rejecting both claims amounts to accepting 
both possibilities. 
 
  Third, expressivism and minimalism entail the falsity of moral syntacticism. If 
moral sentences in their sincere assertoric uses do not serve to express beliefs and if 
there is a conceptually necessary connection between sentences being syntactically 
disciplined and sincere assertoric use of those sentences serving to express beliefs it 
follows that, contrary to appearances, moral sentences are not syntactically 
disciplined. That is, (2) and (3) entail that (1) is false.  
 Those who accept this argument may go on to reject (1a), (1b), or both. Any 
such rejection may seem particularly unpromising when faced with the undeniable 
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evidence that moral sentences are syntactically disciplined. But such views can seem 
more promising if taken in a revisionary spirit, that is, as offering an account not of 
how moral practice actually is, but of how it should be given the theoretical 
understanding provided by the combination of expressivism and minimalism.   
 
2. Overcoming inconsistency 
 
 (1), (2) and (3) appear inconsistent. Yet all three positions are backed by 
argument, whose failure needs to be diagnosed were we to reject the view they 
support. This could perhaps be done, but I wish to question the need to do so. I 
propose that a further option lies open – that of denying that the three claims are 
inconsistent. 
 To see this, one needs to recognise the possibility that there is more than one 
sense of ‗belief‘ in play.  
The first sense of ‗belief‘ is that associated with minimalism. Minimalism 
claims a sentence being syntactic disciplined suffices for its truth-aptness [(2a)] and 
being expressed in a truth-apt sentence suffices for a mental state to be a belief [(2b)]. 
A minimal sense of belief holds that, in addition, being expressible by a truth-apt 
sentence is all there is to a mental states being a belief. Thus what we may call a 
minimal belief is simply any state of mind that is expressed by sincere assertoric use 
of a sentence that is syntactically disciplined. The sentence captures the content of the 
belief. 
Suppose, however, that there is further, robust sense of belief such that a belief 
is robust just in case it is a minimal belief, but also has some further property R not 
possessed by minimal beliefs. Below (§3) I suggest that the property of aiming at 
―The Moral Belief Problem‖ by Neil Sinclair 
 7 
truth might fill this role. Assuming there is some such property the three propositions 
can be made consistent as follows: 
Expressivism can be understood as claiming that moral sentences in their 
sincere assertoric uses do not express robust beliefs. Thus, in (3), ‗belief‘ is read as 
‗robust belief‘. Conversely, minimalism can be understood as claiming that there is a 
conceptually necessary connection between a sentence being syntactically disciplined 
and sincere assertoric uses of that sentence expressing minimal beliefs.
2
 Thus, in (2), 
‗belief‘ is read as ‗minimal belief‘. Further, from the fact that moral sentences in their 
sincere assertoric uses fail to express robust beliefs and that there is a necessary 
connection between syntactic discipline and the expression of minimal beliefs, 
nothing follows for the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. That is, expressivism 
and minimalism, so construed, no longer combine to refute moral syntacticism. Thus 
the three propositions are consistent. 
Three features of this solution to the moral belief problem are worth noting. 
First, it is close to the view put forward in Lenman 2003, according to which 
there are minimal and robust notions, not of belief, but of truth-aptness. If one accepts 
the converse of (2b) – the claim that a sentence is truth-apt only when sincere 
assertoric use of that sentence serves to express a belief – the two senses of belief I 
distinguish will feed into a distinction similar to Lenman‘s. But will my psychological 
distinction between types of mental state mesh with Lenman‘s semantic contrast 
between different ways that we go about understanding sentences? There is some 
reason to think so. Roughly, Lenman‘s contrast is between sentences that can be 
understood only in terms of their truth-conditions and those that can be understood 
                                                          
2
 This renders minimalism trivial – as we might expect from a theory based on ‗platitudes‘. See Wright 
1992.  
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through understanding an equivalent but non-truth-apt sentence. If robust beliefs are 
states that aim at truth (as I will argue) this will explain why the sentences used to 
express them can be understood only in terms of their truth-conditions. Thus my 
account promises to mesh with and explain Lenman‘s semantic contrast.3 
 Second, accepting two senses of belief needn‘t commit one to the view that 
our actual uses of the term ‗belief‘ are systematically ambiguous. Since robust beliefs 
are simply minimal beliefs that possess some additional property, all robust beliefs 
will be minimal beliefs. It is possible to claim, therefore, that all pretheoretical uses of 
the term belief refer simply to minimal beliefs. Similar remarks apply were one to 
accept, with Lenman, two derived notions of truth-aptness. 
 Finally, some things can be said to create a presumption in favour of this 
approach. First, it preserves the possibility of good arguments in favour of each of the 
three claims. By denying inconsistency one avoids summarily rejecting all possible 
arguments for one of the positions. Second, the approach recognises the possibility of 
a cleavage between our pretheoretical and theoretical concept of belief. By so doing, 
it recognises the possibility that a complete account of (robust) belief might require 
non-platitudinous philosophical and empirical insight gleaned from examining such 
issues as the structure of intentional action explanation and the taxonomy of 
psychological states (Blackburn 1998a: fn.6) 
 
                                                          
3
 As Lenman himself hopes such accounts might (2003: 54).  
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3. A robust sense of belief 
 
 All this depends, of course, on there being some property R possessed by 
robust but not minimal beliefs. What sort of thing are we looking for in R? I suggest 
three constraints.  
 First, R must be such that there are some minimal beliefs that lack it, and 
hence that there are some minimal beliefs that are not robust beliefs. If R were to be 
possessed by all minimal beliefs as such, then the point of postulating such a property 
would be lost.  
 Second, it will be welcome if R is such that, when attributed of a certain class 
of states, it explains why the linguistic expressions of those states are disciplined. In 
other words, it would be welcome if the account of robust beliefs explains why robust 
beliefs are minimal beliefs (Lenman 2003: 52-54). There may of course be other 
possible explanations for the discipline of a class of sentences. But part of the point of 
claiming that a class of sentences express robust beliefs should be to explain what has 
so far been taken for granted, namely the source of that discipline. 
 Third, the account of robust belief that R provides should at least be 
compatible with, and perhaps go some way to explaining, our prereflective thoughts 
concerning the nature of beliefs. Such thoughts include: that beliefs are states 
designed to fit the facts; that beliefs are states that represent possible ways the world 
could be; beliefs are states that guide us around the world.  
 
With these constraints in mind, I wish to discuss a recent suggestion: that 
robust beliefs aim at truth (Lenman 2003; Lillehammer 2002).  
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 Two questions arise: First, what is it in particular for truth to be the aim of 
belief? Second, what is it for beliefs to aim at anything at all?  
 For a particular belief whose content is captured by the syntactically 
disciplined sentence ‗p‘, to aim at truth is for the believer to aim to have that belief 
only if that content is true (Velleman 2000). According to minimalism, the content of 
a belief is true just in case the sentence that characterises that content meets the 
standards of discipline for the discourse in which it is a part. Hence for beliefs to aim 
at truth is for a believer to aim to believe that p only if p; to aim to believe that q only 
if q; and so on. These cases can be generalised by saying that for beliefs to aim at 
truth is for the believer to aim to have the content of her beliefs match the state of the 
world.  
 What about aiming? To aim at anything is to be subject to criticism should one 
fail to achieve that aim – as is shown by the fact that criticism can often be deflected 
by showing it to rely on a misconception of one‘s aim (‗But I was always aiming for 
the back of the green‘). So for beliefs to aim at truth, in the above sense, is for beliefs 
to be subject to criticism just in case their content fails to match the state of the world. 
Thus: 
 
(4) A mental state aims at truth iff the state is criticisable, qua state of that 




If this is what it is for beliefs to aim at truth, can their so aiming define a class 
of distinctively robust beliefs?  
 
                                                          
4
 I take this to be the view put forward by Anscombe (1957: 56). 
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No – because all minimal beliefs aim at truth in this sense (so the first 
constraint on R is not satisfied). To elaborate: A minimal belief is any state of mind 
expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence. The content 
of minimal beliefs can fail to match the state of the world in the following sense: the 
belief has the content that p and p doesn‘t meet the standards of discipline for the 
discourse of which p is a part; or the belief has the content that q and q doesn‘t meet 
the standards of discipline for the discourse of which q is a part; or…and so on. When 
minimal beliefs fail to match the state of the world in this way they will be criticisable 
for failing to do so: the belief that p will be criticisable to the extent that p doesn‘t 
meet the standards of discipline for the discourse of which p is a part; the belief that q 
will be criticisable to the extent that q doesn‘t meet the standards of discipline for the 
discourse of which q is a part; and so on. The possibility of such criticism is 
guaranteed by the discourse-dependent standards of discipline that one is subject to 
merely in virtue of having a belief with a certain content. Thus all minimal beliefs are 
criticisable to the extent that their content fails to match the state of the world. Hence 
all minimal beliefs aim at truth in the sense given in (4). Thus this cannot be the sense 
of aiming at truth that defines a robust sense of belief, as Lenman supposes.
5
   
 
The defender of a distinction between minimal and robust beliefs based on the 
property of aiming at truth must therefore offer another account of that property.  
One suggestion is as follows: mental states aim at truth when their function is 
to have their content match the state of the world (Lillehammer 2002; Gibbard 1990: 
108-9). More precisely, a mental state aims at truth when it is the product of a 
                                                          
5
 This argument owes much to that of Divers and Miller (1995: 39)  
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mechanism whose function is to produce states of mind whose content matches the 
state of the world.  
What notion of function is involved here? Kitcher (1993) has suggested that 
the function of an entity is that which it was designed to do, where what an entity is 
designed to do is that effect for which it was selected (either by natural selection or by 
conscious intention). Hence the function of the heart is to pump blood, since this is 
the effect for which it was selected (by natural selection). Similarly, the function of 
the sparkplug is to ignite the fuel, since this is the effect for which it was selected (by 
conscious intention). According to Kitcher, ‗selection for‘ is always historical: an 
entity has an effect for which it was selected when instances of that type of entity 
either originated or persist because of that effect. Thus ascertaining function requires 
ascertaining selectional history.  
This approach to selection seems too narrow, for it rules out assigning 
function to any entity that doesn‘t have the right kind of selectional history. For 
example, on Kitcher‘s view, when I use a mallet to try to break open a Kinder Egg the 
function of the mallet in the action cannot be to break open the Kinder Egg, because 
this is not what mallets have been historically selected for. To avoid this problem, we 
can distinguish a further non-historical sense in which entities can have effects for 
which they are selected: an entity is selected for because of a certain effect when that 
entity is used in the way it is because of that effect. Thus I use the mallet to try to 
break open the Kinder Egg because (I believe) it will have the effect of, precisely, 
breaking open the Kinder Egg. Thus, to modify Kitcher‘s view, the function of an 
entity is that effect it has been selected for, where ‗selection for‘ is determined either 
historically through natural or artificial selection, or non-historically through present 
usage. Note that non-historical selection still allows for the possibility of malfunction: 
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the entity will malfunction just in case the effects of that entity do not include the 
effect which explains why the entity is used as it is. In my example, the mallet will 
malfunction just in case it doesn‘t smash open the Kinder Egg.  
Like most representations, such as maps and thermometer levels, beliefs are 
used to guide us round the world. The best explanation of why we use representations 
in this way is that the system responsible for them is taken to produce representations 
whose content matches the state of the world. Thus the function of such a system is to 
produce representations whose content matches the state of the world. That is, the 
function of beliefs (like other representations) is to have their contents match the state 




Unlike the previous reading of ‗aiming at truth‘ this functional reading meets 
the three constraints on R.  
First, there is no guarantee that all minimal beliefs aim at truth in this sense. 
There are two ways in which minimal beliefs can fail to do so. First, minimal beliefs 
may be used to guide us round the world, but for some other reason than that their 
contents are taken to correspond to the world. Perhaps they are so used because being 
guided by them is generally successful, even though they fail to match the state of the 
                                                          
6
 It doesn‘t follow that all beliefs are formed with the purpose, or conscious intention, of having their 
content match the state of the world. For example, innate contentful states might be used to guide an 
individual around the world, and be so used because their content is taken to match the state of the 
world. The function of such states would be to have their content match the state of the world and they 
would thus aim at truth. But since they are innate, such states could not be purposively formed. Thus 
my account of what it is for beliefs to aim at truth is compatible with Owens‘ (2003) denial of the claim 
that beliefs are purposive.   
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world. Second, it may be that minimal beliefs are not used to guide us round the world 
at all. They might instead be used to aid co-ordination of attitudes, for example.  
Second, that beliefs aim at truth in this way will explain why the sentences 
expressing them have the discipline they do. For it will be inappropriate to use a 
sentence that expresses a belief that is result of a malfunction of the system 
responsible for it. Conversely it will be appropriate to use a sentence that expresses a 
belief that is the result of the proper functioning of the system responsible for it.  
Further, it is quite possible that the discipline that applies to certain types of 
syntactically sophisticated sentences is not due the fact that those sentences express 
the contents of mental states whose function is to match the state of the world. 
Minimal beliefs expressed by such sentences will not be robust beliefs.  
Finally, this account is in keeping with the pretheoretical thought that beliefs 
aim at truth, and attempts to given independent substance to that thought. It does so 




I have argued that a promising way to solve the moral belief problem is to 
distinguish two senses of belief: one minimal sense associated with syntactic 
discipline and one robust sense involving aiming at truth, where this is understood in 
terms of function. 
This way of elucidating the concept of robust belief will have consequences 
for meta-ethical debate. In particular, the nature of moral states of mind will depend 
on their use and the explanation of that use. Evolutionary theorising regarding moral 
practice (such as that in Gibbard 1990) will be relevant to these questions. But it will 
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not determine the answers – since evolutionary origins do not always determine 
present usage (Sturgeon 1992). Thus, one consequence of my response to the moral 
belief problem is that evolutionary issues are relevant but not decisive for the issue of 
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